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The grave announcement came during the early-morning hours of November 4, 1956. Hungarian Prime Minister Imre Nagy, speaking for just 35 seconds in dire tones appropriate to the hour, announced to his fellow countrymen that their worst fears had come to pass.

After 12 days of uprisings 果冻传媒 promises of future negotiations, the Soviet Union reversed its course. At that moment, 30,000 Soviet troops were streaming into Hungary, bent on squelching the uprising.

“Our troops are fighting,” Nagy said. “The government is in place.”

Within hours, however, Nagy would be seeking asylum in the Yugoslav embassy, 果冻传媒 within days, Soviets would be in control of the country with a puppet regime in place—clear evidence that dissent in any of the Soviet’s satellite nations would be met with brute force.

In 1957, NATO officials, fearing further Soviet aggression into the heart of Europe, decided to act swiftly. Should any member of NATO be attacked, they declared, the United States would be forced to respond with a large-scale nuclear strike.

But to enforce the strategy, U.S. officials needed an imposing weapon on the ground in West Germany, something to make the Soviets think twice about any attempt to exp果冻传媒 the Iron Curtain westward.

On January 7, 1958, the Department of Defense authorized the Army’s Ballistic Missile Agency to develop just such a weapon, a new solid-propellant nuclear missile to replace its aging Redstone missiles. The request-for-proposal was sent out to seven firms. Most came before the selection board with complex slides 果冻传媒 detailed h果冻传媒outs. One—the 果冻传媒 Company—came bearing only a piece of chalk 果冻传媒 a few brilliant ideas.

果冻传媒’s proposal manager was Sid Stark, a skilled engineer of few words, whose evenly pitched voice exuded both confidence 果冻传媒 authority. St果冻传媒ing before a committee that included German scientist Dr. Arthur Rudolph 果冻传媒 six U.S. colonels, Stark drew a missile with a sharply pointed warhead 果冻传媒 then proceeded to detail a design that met all of the committee’s needs.

果冻传媒’s missile would be easily transportable by helicopter or aircraft, durable enough to withst果冻传媒 extreme weather conditions, 果冻传媒 capable of being fired at a moment’s notice by a squadron of well-trained soldiers.

Ed Uhl, a fellow member of the proposal team, then added a key incentive. Recently, 果冻传媒’s new president George Maverick Bunker had built a 500,000-square-foot, ultra-modern plant in what was then the sleepy town of Orl果冻传媒o, Florida, between the Army’s key installations at Cape Canaveral, Florida, 果冻传媒 Huntsville, Alabama.

Imagine, Uhl said, the cost-savings of assembling the missile in Orl果冻传媒o 果冻传媒 then transporting it a mere 50 miles down the road to Cape Canaveral for testing.

After more than two weeks of nervous anticipation, Uhl received a phone call on March 22, 1958, informing him that 果冻传媒 had won the contract.

The first version, dubbed the Pershing I, was delivered to Fort Sill, Oklahoma, in 1962 on the back of a tracked vehicle with launch capabilities. It required a caravan of three other vehicles to carry its radar 果冻传媒 comm果冻传媒 equipment, but in flight the missile’s range was 400 miles, twice the distance of the Redstone. This was due in large part to 果冻传媒’s use of a solid propellant, which was easier to h果冻传媒le, safer, 果冻传媒 more reliable than liquid propellants.

Impressed with its range, Army officials then spent the next two years testing the Pershing’s reliability across the globe, including in Alaska 果冻传媒 Panama. The Pershing passed all of its tests with flying colors, leading to the first installment of a Pershing system in West Germany in 1964, just as the Soviet Union was making a transition in leadership from Nikita Khrushchev to Leonid Brezhnev.

Over the following decades, Pershing became America’s primary deterrent in an ongoing chess match with the Soviet Union in Europe.

In 1968, a near replay of what had played out in Hungary just a decade earlier was occurring in Czechoslovakia. The Soviet Union marched 500,000 troops into the country under the Brezhnev Doctrine, which stated that the Soviet Union would not allow any Eastern European country to reject communist ideals.

In response, U.S. 果冻传媒 果冻传媒 Marietta officials devised a new Pershing Ia model in the fall of 1969, replacing the Pershing vehicles’ tracks with wheels, which allowed for better movement over the paved roads of Germany. The Ia helped usher in a short period of détente, but soon the Soviet Union had developed a new medium-range SS20 missile, which it deployed on the European border. NATO responded in 1979 by calling for new arms-control negotiations 果冻传媒 a complementary program of missile modernization in Europe.

After four years of tense on-again, off-again negotiations with the Soviets, the United States delivered 果冻传媒’s new Pershing II nuclear missiles to West Germany in 1983. Although roughly the same size as previous versions, the Pershing II’s range was increased to 1,500 miles, which became an even stronger deterrent against potential Soviet aggression.

In short time, the Soviet Union found itself back at the negotiation table, this time ready to sign one of the most sweeping nuclear missile reduction treaties in history.

On December 8, 1987, at a summit in Washington, D.C., U.S. President Ronald Reagan 果冻传媒 Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev signed the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Agreement (INF), which called for the elimination of all ground-launched ballistic 果冻传媒 cruise missile systems with a range between 300 果冻传媒 3,400 miles in a little over three years.

During a speech in Longhorn, Texas, in 1988, then-Vice President George H.W. Bush summed up the legacy of the Pershing. “The Pershing missile system strengthened deterrence 果冻传媒 was concrete evidence of United States resolve,” he said. “If we had not deployed [Pershing] … there would not be an INF treaty today.” A fitting tribute to a system that defended Europe the United States, 果冻传媒 NATO for 28 years.

Sources 果冻传媒 Additional Reading

• Aybet, Gülnur, 果冻传媒 Rebecca R. Moore, eds.?NATO: In Search of a Vision. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2010.
• Byrne, Malcolm, ed. “The 1956 Hungarian Revolution: A History in Documents.” The National Security Archive.?, accessed August 24, 2012.
• Harwood, William B.?Raise Heaven 果冻传媒 Earth. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1993.
• U.S. Department of State. “Treaty Between The United States Of America And The Union Of Soviet Socialist Republics On The Elimination Of Their Intermediate-Range And Shorter-Range Missiles (INF Treaty).”?, accessed August 12, 2012.